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Introduction 
Robert Nozick famously says that since John Rawls’s work on justice ‘political philosophers 
now must either work within Rawls’s theory or explain why not’.2 H. L. A. Hart’s The 
Concept of Law
3
 has exercised a similarly dominating presence for legal philosophers. Much 
work has blossomed as a result and the latest significant contribution is Law as a Leap of 
Faith by John Gardner which seeks to reimagine Hart’s influential work on legal positivism 
in new ways with an exciting collection of fifteen essays, including some previously 
unpublished work. 
Gardner is rather modest about his project’s philosophical ambitions. In his preface, 
he writes that previous attempts to draft a general introduction for this collection were 
unsatisfactory and ultimately abandoned. This is ‘because there is no bigger picture. I don’t 
have a theory of law’.4 Instead, he provides us with ‘quite a lot of thoughts about law in 
general and I can only hope that they turn out to be consistent with each other’.5 Gardner 
claims that philosophy is not about ‘compiling as many little thoughts as possible into as few 
big thoughts as possible, but the art of wearing every thought down to its rightful little size 
and then keeping it in its rightful little place’.6 Law as a Leap of Faith is a collection of 
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comments about the law rather than a complete theory about law where Gardner claims to be 
engaged in a project of ‘unbundling’ where the aim is to clarify our understanding of law 
through a re-evaluation of Hart’s legacy and how it might be improved further. 
Gardner’s modesty is misplaced. He advises his readers ‘you will struggle to find any 
conspicuously novel ideas about law in the book’.7 I disagree: this is not a mere assembly of 
interesting, but disconnected thoughts spread across idiosyncratic themes. Instead, this is an 
impressive body of work that gives expression to a powerful vision about the aims and 
limited ambitions of legal positivism. While Gardner does unbundle muddled arguments and 
help us reassess a more compelling view about Hart’s legacy, this is more than a critique of 
where others have gone wrong and it is best considered as essays that challenge some 
fundamental tenets about the commitments and limits of legal positivism as well as the 
relation of law and morality more broadly. I will address Gardner’s contributions in these 
areas focussing on the relevance of a belief in law, morality for positivists and a comment on 
the Fuller-Hart debate before concluding with some critical remarks about Garner’s 
understanding of morality and normativity. 
 
The Philosophers’ Belief 
The title essay, ‘Law as a Leap of Faith’, has been seen as both ‘the most interesting’ and 
‘also the most obscure’ piece in the book.8 This is not without good reason. Gardner begins 
with a brief passage from Plato’s Euthyphro where Socrates addresses the problem of 
‘whether the holy is beloved of the gods because it is holy, or holy because it is beloved of 
the gods’.9 Gardner translates this into Judeo-Christian terms as a puzzle about an all-
powerful and all-knowing God:  
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On the one hand, we are told that whatever this God commands is the right thing to do 
by virtue of God commanding it. This is an aspect of God’s omnipotence. On the 
other hand, we are reassured that whatever this God commands is commanded 
because it is the right thing to do. This is an aspect of God’s omniscience. But these 
propositions about God and His commands cannot be true at once. Either this God 
makes a constitutive difference to what we should do or He does not. So which is it to 
be?
10
 
 
For Gardner, the puzzle is this: either God’s commands, as His commands, make activities 
right that would be wrong otherwise or God’s commands merely indicate what is right 
already. If the former, then there may not be any rational justification for why activities are 
right independently of God’s commands. If the latter, then it is unclear what is added by the 
fact something is commanded by God because we might discern what is right independently 
of any such instruction. So either what is right because it is commanded and no more or 
because it right independently of whether it is commanded.  
The puzzle, for Gardner, is it cannot be both at the same time. Either God’s 
commands, as His commands, makes a constitutive difference or it does not. Our way out 
might be to say, in his words, that ‘reasoned argument is useless in the sight of God; only 
faith will do’.11 The problem with such a solution is that ‘faith cannot lend its justifications to 
the faithless’.12 
 This discussion is meant to provide an insight into longstanding debates between legal 
positivism and natural law about the relation between law and morality. Gardner argues: ‘In 
the tradition of legal positivism, law is binding because it is posited. In the natural law 
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tradition, on the other hand, law is posited because it is binding. Surely it cannot be both, one 
must choose between positivism and natural law’.13 So how to choose? Do we require a leap 
of faith to recognise law’s commands as commands or not? 
 Gardner turns to Hans Kelsen’s theory of law. Whereas Søren Kierkegaard argues we 
must make a leap of faith because of the limitations of rationality for theology, Gardner 
claims that Kelsen – the Kierkegaard of jurisprudence? – argues for a leap of faith about the 
nature of law. Gardner says: 
 
Therefore, just as a theist may dissolve the Socratic dilemma of theism by holding 
that God just is goodness personified, so a Kelsenian resolves the structurally 
identical dilemma of positivism and natural law by holding that law is rightness 
institutionalized. The question of whether legal rules are posited because right, or 
right because posited, thus ultimately evaporates.
14
 
 
For Kelsen, the ultimate source of validity for any legal system is its basic norm, or 
Grundnorm.
15
 This basic norm is a ‘fusion, in the juristic consciousness, of authorization and 
rightness. The Grundnorm is, in this sense, the juristic God’.16 This is because it, like God, 
can make right, through its demands, what might be wrong otherwise. The importance of the 
Grundnorm is its attempt at reconciling legal positivism and natural law through an act of 
faith concerning our allegiance to it. There are many different kinds of reasons, including 
non-moral reasons, for supporting the Grundnorm not unlike the variety of reason that may 
persuade us to believe in God. 
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 These arguments about the similarities between theistic and ‘legalistic belief’ are not 
meant to show they lack important differences. But there is an interesting, and perhaps 
arresting, thought arising from this somewhat strained analogy that Gardner attributes to 
Ronald Dworkin: ‘we cannot hypothesize the presuppositions of lawyers without endorsing 
them. So not only lawyers but also legal theorists can only talk about law while being 
committed to it’.17 Gardner disagrees and he denies that lawyers need be ‘true believers’.18 
But why? Specifically, why do we not require a leap of faith in law? 
This title piece is fascinating and somewhat frustrating because we must look 
elsewhere to piece together a more complete picture about Gardner’s views concerning law 
and faith. In a later piece, Gardner explores the nature of law’s claims. ‘The law’ does not 
make claims on us per se. Instead, only law-applying officials make claims for law: ‘the 
claims of law are identical to certain claims of its officials’.19 Legal claims, such as a legal 
obligation or right, are claims about what law claims: they are second-order claims.
20
 One 
implication is that errors about law’s claims are not errors of law, but rather errors 
attributable to the law-applying officials who express those claims.
21
 The sphere of legal 
claims is not a realm of beliefs, but rather a world of everyday practices. 
The legal claims made by law-applying officials are also moral claims and we will 
consider how Gardner understands the relation of law with morality in the following sections 
below. Nonetheless, the moral claims often implicit in legal claims need not require any 
belief from officials. This is because they do not, or at least need not, speak for themselves. 
Gardner says: ‘Librarians advocate literacy but they may be TV-loving philistines. Recycling 
officers agitate to reduce waste but they may be gas-guzzling slobs. Judges make moral 
claims for law but they may be anarchist subversives who are trying to bring law down from 
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the inside’.22 Our faith in law, if we have any, need not be a faith in its morality even though 
law’s claims have a moral character.23  ‘Morality has no officials and cannot make claims’, 
but law-applying officials making legal claims create moral claims concurrently.
24
  
There ‘can be immoral laws’ as valid law may lack moral merit.25 But the moral 
merits of law’s claims are expressed by the claims of officials and may not reflect their 
individual view about moral claims more generally.
26
 So the legal claims are moral claims, 
but do not represent any comprehensively ‘thick’ conception about morality and these claims 
do not require moral merit to be legally valid. More importantly the law can create moral 
obligations that are legally recognized ‘whether or not it took the morally correct path in 
doing so’.27 Law and morality are linked as part of what Gardner calls ‘the inescapable 
morality thesis’.28 Interestingly, the link law and morality share does not require we assess 
law’s validity in terms of its merits without our discounting the central place of morality in 
our engagement with legal claims. 
Let us bring back Gardner’s earlier discussion of theistic commands. In his essay ‘Of 
the Difference between a Genius and an Apostle’, Kierkegaard argues that a parent or Christ 
possesses authority not because either can provide a reasonable justification for their 
commands we might accept, but rather because of their authority as a parent or Christ. 
Kierkegaard says: ‘To be prepared to obey a government if it can be clever is really to make a 
fool of it. To honour one’s father because he is intelligent is impiety’.29 Their authority 
derives from our belief and a leap of faith: reason can only get us so far. But this is not to 
argue that there are no reasons to justify our accepting the authority of their commands. Of 
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course, Kierkegaard is providing arguments aimed at convincing us to make a leap of faith 
after all. The validity of their authority is distinctly separate from a consideration of its 
merits—and not unlike a legal positivist understanding of law. 
Now let us return to where this section began and reconsider the possible obscurity of 
this first, title essay. What is its relevance to the other essays? Gardner’s project is to shake 
up our widely held beliefs about the law and especially legal positivism to convert us to a 
more promising and clear view of law. Law requires a leap of faith, but not without reasons 
which will require our revising commonplace, almost dogmatic, beliefs about the nature of 
law we would recognise as problematic if only we could see the light. Law as a Leap of Faith 
is much more about fundamental challenges to our beliefs about the law than providing a new 
religion. 
 
Positivist Morality 
Perhaps the best known previously published essay in this collection is ‘Legal Positivism: 5 
½ Myths’.30 One particular myth that receives much attention from Gardner concerns the 
relation of law and morality for legal positivism. Legal positivism is a broad church 
encompassing a diversity of perspectives. They are thought to adhere to a common core 
belief about the nature of law summarised by Gardner as LP*: 
 
(LP*) In any legal system, whether a given norm is legally value, and hence whether 
it forms part of the law of that system, depends on its sources, not its merits (where its 
merits, in the relevant sense, include the merits of its sources).
31
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LP* does not deny that the fact Rex is a noble king may speak to why his subjects understand 
his word as law, ‘but it is his word that they regard as law’.32 Law is valid dependent on its 
sources alone. 
 One of the myths Gardner attempts to overcome is that LP* is a proposition about 
what might make norms valid as legal norms (and thus part of the law). The value or merit of 
legal norms is a separate matter from their importance for law. But one implication is that we 
can accept a legal norm as a legal norm without denying the relevance of its merits in the 
evaluation of law. Gardner emphasizes that LP* is ‘normatively inert’ and value-neutral 
rather than value-hostile.
33
 Legal positivists endorse LP*, but it does not commit them to 
accepting the so-called ‘separability thesis’.34 
 The view that legal positivists accept this thesis—the claim that ‘there is no necessary 
connection between law and morality’—is perhaps the biggest myth of them all with one 
popular textbook in jurisprudence claiming this thesis is, in fact, ‘the quintessence of legal 
positivism’.35 Gardner claims the thesis is ‘absurd and no legal philosopher of note has ever 
endorsed it as it stands’.36 
 That we have a legal obligation is a question of validity and not its merits. But it is an 
intrinsically moral question as well because ‘moral issues’ are raised by law ‘even if the law 
is not advertised or enforced’ because its bare existence can and often does influence how we 
act and relate to others.
37
 Gardner says: ‘Every legal issue, however superficially technical, is 
a moral issue, for its resolution inevitably has important consequences for someone’.38 The 
difference between legal systems and games is that while each has rules only the rules in 
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legal systems can be moral claims with potentially important consequences.
39
 In a later essay, 
he argues ‘To change the law is inevitably to change the position of some people in morally 
important ways . . . Every legal issue, however superficially technical, is a moral issue, for its 
resolution inevitably has morally important consequences for someone’.40 A legal norm is 
like a ‘putative (or purported or supposed) moral norm’: a legally valid proposal for 
addressing moral problems.
41
 Implicit is the idea that legal obligations possess a moral 
character which we will return to in the conclusion below. 
 Nevertheless, it is easy to locate the historical genealogy behind the modern origins of 
this myth. Famously, John Austin argued ‘the existence of law is one thing; its merit or 
demerit is another’.42 Gardner claims that Hart incorrectly takes this ‘ringing endorsement’ 
by Austin of LP* as an endorsement of a very different thesis about the separability of law 
and morality when determining legal validity.
43
 For Gardner, Hart should not, and need not, 
have made this mistake. Of course, if Gardner is correct, it appears that Hart must bear some 
of the blame for perpetuating this particular myth about legal positivism. Hart is critical of 
legal theories that offer a ‘close assimilation of law to morality’ because they ‘seem, in the 
end, often to confuse one kind of obligatory conduct with another’ and they fail to provide 
sufficient room for differences ‘between legal and moral rules and for divergences in their 
requirements’.44 Furthermore, Hart defines legal positivism as ‘the simple contention that it is 
in no sense a necessary truth that laws reproduce or satisfy demands of morality, though in 
fact they have often done so’.45 Hart then gives us passages that suggest some support for the 
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separability thesis. While this support may be illusory, like most myths this one has at least 
some basis in facts. 
 Nonetheless, Gardner’s claim is that Hart need not have understood legal positivism 
as requiring a belief about a necessary separation of law and morality. Instead, Hart is only 
committed to LP* which is a claim about legal validity that denies laws are valid because of 
their moral merits. Gardner notes that ‘they do not deny the converse proposition that laws 
might be morally meritorious because of their validity’.46 So while Hart’s claim might appear 
to defend a particular view about the nature of law, it should only be understood as a claim 
about legal validity if we view it in its best light.
47
 
 This reading of Hart on legal positivism opens up a new possibility for how law and 
morality might be understood for positivists. One is to reject the mythical assumption that 
LP* has implications for how judges or governments might act. For Gardner, there are no 
such implications in fact.
48
 Legal positivism is ‘agnostic’ about whether any valid legal 
norms are worth having or following—such considerations require further argument and 
highlight the conceptual limits of legal positivism’s embrace of LP* at its core.49 Many 
languages address law in paired senses of ‘legal’, such as lex and ius, Gesetz and Recht or loi 
and droit. It is commonly thought legal positivists are concerned with one, but not the other. 
For example, our focus should be on what is Gesetz (or ‘what is posited’ in law) rather than 
what is Recht (or ‘what is Right’ in a more normatively-rich sense). Gardner’s reformulation 
of legal positivism rejects this widely shared belief. This is because to accept LP* does not 
entail denial that legality might identify a moral value.
50
 Legal positivism can help us answer 
what is Gesetz, but this does not mean questions about how Gesetz might be Recht cannot be 
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asked or nonsensical: they simply require us to look beyond the limited constraints of LP*.
51
 
Legal positivists need not take sides. 
 Moreover, Gardner’s reformulation seems closer to the spirit, if not letter, of Hart’s 
understanding of legal positivism. Hart did not appear to endorse an understanding of law 
separately from moral concerns. Moral rules often interact ‘side by side with laws which 
forbid what it enjoins’ and where the two come apart ‘law loses such battles’ ‘very often’.52 
Nor can it be ‘seriously disputed that the development of law, at all times and places, has in 
fact been profoundly influenced both by the conventional morality and ideals of particular 
social groups’.53 And, of course, Hart endorsed a ‘minimum content of Natural Law’ whereby 
its absence would offer citizens ‘no reason for obeying voluntarily any rules’.54 There is no 
contradiction in Hart’s endorsement of legal positivism and a minimum content of Natural 
Law, especially if viewed from Gardner’s reformulation whereby legal positivism is a partial 
theory about law focused solely with its legal validity and so requires some further view 
about law that moves beyond the limited focus of LP*. This is not only a better reading of 
Hart’s position, but a more compelling view about legal positivism and its conceptual 
limitations. This reading is further consistent with claims about the compatibility of legal 
positivism, understood as an endorsement of LP*, with other views about law as well, such as 
legal realism and perhaps others.
55
  
 
Fuller Revisited 
Gardner revisits the Fuller-Hart debate. Lon Fuller argues that legal norms hold validity 
according to their formal merits.
56
 For instance, legal norms that are retroactively, radically 
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uncertain and devoid of generality fail to satisfy a criteria of legality on their merits. Hart 
disagrees and he argues that such legal norms are no less valid qua legal even here such 
norms are ‘deficient relative to the ideal of the rule of law’.57  
Gardner claims Hart should have gone further and argue ‘that legal reasons (including 
legal norms) are reasons of a distinctively merit-independent type’ consistent with LP*.58 
Gardner views the Fuller-Hart debate as centring on a conflation of a form-content distinction 
with a source-merit distinction. If we believe form and content as separable, then what 
matters for law is its source and not its merits. But if we claim form and content are 
interlinked, then legality may depend on its merits. So the position we take on the first 
distinction determines our position about the second distinction.  
 Gardner argues that an understanding about legal validity as source-based need not 
limit us to source-based criticisms of law. His argument is that it is not incompatible or legal 
positivists to argue a norm is legally valid and yet ‘should be universally attacked, shunned, 
ignored, or derided’.59 This is only a surprising result if we accept a myth about legal 
positivism is about. As discussed above, Gardner argues that legal positivism is, in fact, a 
partial conception about the nature of law.
60
 It is therefore one of several myths plaguing 
jurisprudence that legal positivism is a complete theory. Instead, it is nothing more than an 
important ‘thesis about legal validity . . . compatible with any number of further theses about 
law’s nature’.61 If Hart had understood legal positivism in terms of LP*, then this would 
develop and improve his response to Fuller. 
 One wider consequence is what Gardner describes as ‘a disturbing conclusion’, 
namely, ‘the rule of law, in its widest interpretation, is not a valid moral ideal’.62 This is 
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because ‘immoral lawyering, even immoral lawyering that stands up for the rule of law, is 
always a live possibility’.63 The potential danger is that lawyers may be encouraged to 
believe that in defending the rule of law this will be enough ‘to save us from the abyss’.64 The 
problem remains ‘there is always more, and sometimes more important, work to do’.65 The 
fact that legal claims can have moral aims does not entail only morally satisfactory outcomes 
will result.
66
 Fuller’s formal criteria may help elucidate an important minimum content of 
law’s merits, but it is not enough on its own to guarantee the law is meritorious. 
 
The Problem of Normativity 
Gardner claims: ‘the real problem of normativity, for me, is Hart’s problem of normativity: if 
a norm is such that its existence doesn’t already entail that we have reason enough to engage 
with it, in what sense is it a norm?’67 Gardner says that we can determine norms through their 
use: ‘something is a norm if it can be used as a norm’.68 Norms can be used in different ways, 
such as a detached way,
69
 and so some care must be given to their uses. 
 I note this issue because I believe there is a real problem of normativity at work, but it 
looks different than this which should be considered separately. Gardner’s understanding of 
legal positivism as a commitment to LP* reveals legal positivism as a partial theory about 
law. Gardner also understands legal claims as moral claims. But what, or which, morality is 
at work? 
 My contention is that the idea of legal claims as kinds of moral claims should be 
reconsidered as kinds of normative claims instead. The appeal to morality need not include 
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any link with a distinctive moral view, or ‘comprehensive doctrine’.70 Gardner’s argument is 
that legal claims can have normative force because they often have some normative 
significance where these claims are not considered in some ‘detached way’ as noted earlier. 
Legal claims have an ethical dimension that the idea of their being normative claims 
sufficiently brings out. 
 The problem with describing normative claims as moral claims is that it suggests 
these claims relate to a single, identifiable moral view. The fact a claim has normative 
significance may be agnostic or open-textured on which particular moral view it might relate 
to. In many cases, it may be difficult given ‘the fact of reasonable pluralism’ to identify any 
particular moral view at play as perhaps there is no distinctive morality appealed to beyond 
an overlapping consensus linking different and contrasting comprehensive doctrines about 
morality. So much as legal positivism is a partial view, the ‘moral’ claims of law might be 
best approached as merely normative. To say otherwise is to recommend that any moral 
claims of law are linked to some particular, complete view about morality which is not 
altogether clear or even likely. There is then a problem of normativity relating to Gardner’s 
discussion of law that could be easily settled by jettisoning the idea of law’s providing us 
with claims of any distinctive morality and instead argue law has a normative dimension as it 
surely has and which he so ably makes clear. 
 
Conclusion 
Gardner’s Law as a Leap of Faith is a work that challenges many of our most widely held 
beliefs about law with a special focus on legal positivism. This collection of papers is the 
product of one of our finest legal philosophers today with significant contributions to our 
understanding of the nature of law and key debates about it by earlier leading figures. While 
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there is no space to address every discussion of wider interest, it is hoped this Review has 
made clear its central arguments and their impact for jurisprudence. In my judgement, this is 
one of the most important works of jurisprudence in many years. 
 
 
 
